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ANCIENT-FUTURE HERMENEUTICS:
POSTMODERNISM, BIBLICAL INERRANCY, AND THE RULE OF FAITH​[1]​
ABSTRACT:

At the heart of two recent theological traditions are hermeneutical principles which are not only consistent but are integrated in the hermeneutics of Augustine. According to the doctrine of biblical inerrancy as it has been recently articulated by Evangelicals, Scripture has an original meaning, and that meaning is not open to the possibility of error. According to some thinkers in postmodern theology, including Jean-Luc Marion, the meaning of Scripture transcends its original meaning. After examining postmodernism and inerrancy, I consider their harmony in the writings of Augustine, who takes original meaning as a guide for understanding that biblical meaning which transcends it.  An Augustinian hermeneutic consistent with inerrancy is thus an alternative to the more typical non-inerrantist postmodern theologies.
	In recent decades many theologians and philosophers have turned to a study of hermeneutics.  This has proved to be a fruitful development.  Ideas from the postmodern tradition have been particularly effective stimuli to thought and discussion, and some thinkers, such as Kevin Vanhoozer,​[2]​ have done very good work integrating postmodern insights with traditional Christianity.
It is my intention in this paper to explore one area of possible integration that has not yet received sufficient attention, if indeed it has been attempted at all, by contemporary theologians.  At first glance, it may seem that few theological traditions could be more antithetical than postmodern theology and biblical inerrancy.  Yet, I contend, inerrancy and postmodern theology are not (or are not entirely) antithetical.  To the contrary, central components of these traditions are consistent and can be integrated.  Moreover, the integration of these very insights has already been accomplished in the writings of Augustine.
What are these insights?  Primarily these: The authority of the human authors of the Christian Scriptures is such that whatever is included in their original intent in these Scriptures is true.  This doctrine calls the reader of Scripture who does not have the original meaning at arm’s length to a posture of epistemic humility—an epistemically humble approach to the reading of Scripture.  However, the significance of Scripture surpasses that which was intended by its human authors, meaning no less than what the divine Author of Scripture intends.  This calls for an epistemically humble approach to human authorship.
This hermeneutical perspective consists mainly of two broad claims about the original intent of the human authors and about biblical meaning: That the former is without error, and that the latter transcends the former.  The integration of these claims is part of the rule of faith in Augustine’s theology.  Yet this ancient theology still lives.  The postmodern turn in philosophy serves as a poignant reminder of epistemic humility, urges us to not take a purely rationalistic approach to the biblical text, and reminds us that the biblical text is more than its human authorship.  From an Augustinian perspective, the place of the doctrine of inerrancy in the postmodern era maintains, as it always did, its guardianship of the rule of faith—of the essentials of Christian orthodoxy and the rule to love God and neighbor.
In this paper I shall develop these ideas through interaction with texts both recent and ancient.  I shall begin with postmodernism.  Following that I shall look at inerrancy. Then I shall show how postmodern insights may be applied to the Bible in ways consistent with inerrancy.  This will lead us back to the hermeneutics of Augustine.
I. POSTMODERNISM
	The postmodern era is characterized by a rediscovery of epistemic humility, and postmodern theology is no exception.  In this section I shall first look at Jean-François Lyotard’s definition of postmodernism and discuss its relationship to Christianity.  Then I shall turn to Martin Heidegger’s critique of “onto-theology.”  Finally, I shall examine Jean-Luc Marion’ critique of intellectual idolatry in God Without Being.
What is more or less the official definition of postmodernism is found in Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: “incredulity toward metanarratives.”​[3]​  So what is a metanarrative?  Lyotard gives the following examples: “the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.”​[4]​  Now these are the narratives of modernism, not of Christianity, which predates modernism; accordingly, Merold Westphal lists in the introduction to his Overcoming Onto-theology three senses of metanarrative which do not describe the Christian “meganarrative,” and just one sense in which it does.​[5]​  Modernism, the main target of postmodern skepticism, is “a story of progress from opinion and superstition to scientific truth and on to universal peace and happiness.”​[6]​  Two problems with the metanarratives of modernism immediately present themselves.  For the first, Bruce Ellis Benson has this to say: “One characteristic of all grand reçits is that they are encompassing enough to explain everything.”​[7]​  But surely finite knowers will never possess an explanation of everything, and historic Christianity has certainly never said such a thing.  As Westphal says: “The truth is that there is Truth, but in our finitude and fallenness we do not have access to it. We’ll have to make do with the truths available to us; but that does not mean either that we should deny the reality of Truth or that we should abandon the distinction between truth and falsity.”​[8]​  Westphal also points out the second problem with the metanarratives of modernism: “One of the most important assumptions of philosophical modernity . . . is the autonomy of the human knower.”​[9]​  Again, historic Christianity dissents: Scripture has complete authority over the individual Christian, and the Creeds and church history also have their own degrees of epistemic authority.
One component of the postmodern tradition’s skepticism toward metanarratives has been particularly formative of postmodern thought on religion, and that is Martin Heidegger’s critique of what he labeled “onto-theology.”  The etymology of the term is obvious; it is plain from its Greek ancestors ontos, theos, and logos that it has something to do with God and metaphysics.  That to which Heidegger referred when he coined the term is no less than an attempt to fit God within our metaphysical categories.  Ontology, he explains, is the study of beings, while theology is the study of the Being of beings, that which gives existence to beings; metaphysics has historically been the study of both beings and Being.​[10]​  In Heidegger’s words, “this means: metaphysics is onto-theo-logy.”​[11]​  Metaphysics has carried out its project by beginning with beings; later, when metaphysics needs something to solve the problem of the metaphysical ground of beings, it ushers God into the equation as Being.  So that Being can be the cause of all beings, God is treated as the causa sui, the cause of itself.  This is the only use metaphysics has for God: “The Being of beings is represented fundamentally, in the sense of the ground, only as causa sui.”​[12]​
Besides the logical problems involved with the notion of the causa sui, this onto-theological God is merely a tool of metaphysics.  This God is a concept used to serve a purpose, a God created by metaphysical inquiry and subservient to its ends.  Perhaps still worse, one cannot truly worship this intellectual God; in Heidegger’s memorable words, “This is the right name for the god of philosophy.  Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god.  Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god.”​[13]​
Thus Heidegger.  Let us turn to Marion to see how he applies postmodern thought to religion.  What is the difference between an icon and an idol?  Marion answers this question by calling our attention to the intention with which we approach a religious object.  The idol is that at which, when we look at it, our gaze stops.  In Marion’s words, “In the idol, the gaze is buried.”​[14]​  The idol is that which a human approaches with the intention of seeing a full disclosure of the divine.  The icon, however, is the same object looked at with a different intention.  We look at an icon in order that it may draw our gaze to see the divine beyond it.  The gaze that looks at the icon is a gaze that pierces the visible.​[15]​  The idol is that at which I gaze when I hope to see God fully disclosed to me, but the icon is that at which I gaze when I hope to see God while at the same time remembering that I cannot see all of God.
Because we look at an idol with the intention of seeing the divine, the idol “consigns the divine” to fit within “the measure of a human gaze.”​[16]​  Such is the general difference between an icon and an idol; but Marion is critiquing intellectual idolatry specifically.  The intellectual idol reduces the divine to the limits of our comprehension.  The intellectually idolatrous gaze replaces the divine with a concept that fits inside the human understanding.  But the intellectual icon is a concept for God that does not purport to be a full disclosure of the divine.  Thus David Tracy in the Foreword to God Without Being: “For Marion, reason, although crucial . . . , is, on its own, not an icon but an ‘idol’.”​[17]​  To try to fit God within the limits of human reason is to make an idol out of reason.  Our concepts of God show us a shadow of God, not God in his fullness.
II. INERRANCY
	In light of these lessons on epistemic humility, I wish to look at the doctrine of biblical inerrancy, taking as my primary text The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy.    First I shall give a rudimentary definition and explanation of inerrancy.  Then I shall develop this account of inerrancy by responding to three objections and elucidating the doctrine’s presumption of a view I will call textual realism.  This assumption, I argue, is a rational assumption; moreover, I consider both it and inerrancy to be consistent with major hermeneutical claims from the likes of Vanhoozer and Hans Frei.  Textual realism is also an assumption which points us to epistemic humility.  Epistemic humility is necessary not despite but rather because of textual realism.  We need an epistemically humble approach (on the part of the reader) to authorial intent.  Epistemic humility leads us back to postmodern philosophy, and so in the following section I shall examine inerrancy’s relation to postmodern thought.
Inerrancy is simply the doctrine that the intent of the human authors of Scripture, whatever that intent is, is not open to the possibility of error.  Since inerrancy is about the author’s intent, the scope of the doctrine is less than is sometimes thought.  For example, the Chicago Statement explicitly limits the doctrine to the autographs: “We affirm that inspiration, strictly speaking, applies only to the autographic text of Scripture . . . .”​[18]​  Both surviving manuscripts and biblical translations are open to the possibility of error; indeed, errors frequently occur in transmission and translation.
Nor does inerrancy amount to a thesis supporting the univocity of theological language.  Whatever a biblical author is trying to communicate to his readers is inerrant, but he may choose to communicate it in literal or non-literal language.  It is a misunderstanding of inerrancy to think that it commits one to “letterism or wooden literalism.”​[19]​  When interpreting Scripture, all the usual hermeneutical rules apply: The original language, historical context, literary context, and literary genre all must be taken into account.  Again, the Chicago Statement is explicit: “So history must be treated as history, poetry as poetry, hyperbole and metaphor as hyperbole and metaphor, generalization and approximation as what they are, and so forth.”​[20]​
	Let’s look at some objections to inerrancy, beginning with two typical and simple objections and then proceeding to a more sophisticated and postmodern one.​[21]​  One of the most common objections is the claim that the doctrine does us no good since we don’t have that to which inerrancy is ascribed, namely the autographs.  This objection represents a misunderstanding of the doctrine.  The Chicago Statement is correct when it says that, “strictly speaking,”​[22]​ inerrancy applies to the autographs; this is because, strictly speaking, the original meaning of any ancient text is to be found in that text’s autographs!  It is not a question of whether we have the original texts of Scripture, but of whether we have the original meaning of Scripture.  We can have at least as much confidence in the accessibility of the original biblical texts as for other ancient texts.  We lack the autographs for Plato’s Republic, but we are able to piece together a close resemblance of the original text from surviving manuscripts; the biblical autographs can be similarly reconstructed.  In short, lacking the autographs does not prevent us from accessing the original meaning of Scripture, or from making claims about it.
	A second typical objection to inerrancy is that it makes too many distinctions and qualifications to be a meaningful doctrine.  But this objection is either severely wrongheaded, or else is rooted in a misunderstanding of inerrancy.  Inerrancy presumes a degree of realism in regards to ancient texts.  What I propose to call textual realism is the conjunction of three common-sense principles: that there is a text, that it has an original meaning, and that that original meaning is to some degree accessible to the contemporary reader.  In presupposing textual realism, inerrancy merely adopts the same attitude towards ancient texts with which the historian approaches Herodotus, the scholar of literature Gilgamesh, and the philosopher the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle.  Most of the distinctions and qualifications the objector has in mind describe how to reach (or not reach) the original meaning of the text.  The facts remain that there is an original meaning to each biblical text and that this meaning is contained in the author’s intent in the autographs, as is the case with any ancient text.
Rather than transgress this common-sense textual realism by making its various qualifications, inerrancy is simply elucidating textual realism through these qualifications.  Inerrancy is merely a claim about the original meaning of the biblical text—the claim that, due to its divine inspiration, it is never inaccurate.  Any difficulties involved with access to original meaning simply fail as objections to this particular—as well as to practically any other—claim about original meaning.  If they succeeded, then the same difficulties would prevent a philosopher from claiming that Aristotle’s ethical theory is right or wrong; they would prevent a historian from assessing Herodotus’ historical claims as reliable; and they would prevent a reader of Gilgamesh from saying that the story told by its author is a beautiful story.
Now there is a different sort of objection to inerrancy, more sophisticated but also more dangerous.  I refer to the objection that textual realism is simply mistaken—a common enough view in contexts where postmodern thought reigns.  Here there is a turn to the reader and away from the author for meaning.  This objection, of course, cannot sensibly be applied to the biblical text uniquely, for the correctness of the objection would render impossible not only an evangelical’s affirmation of inerrancy, but also a philosopher’s disagreement with Aristotle’s ethical theory, a historian’s agreement with Herodotus, and so forth.
John R. Franke, for example, suggests that “language is a socially constructed human product” and that, as a result, “our words and linguistic conventions do not have timeless and fixed meanings that are independent from their particular usages in human communities and traditions.”​[23]​  He intends this not (or not directly) as a remark about the Bible, but rather as an objection to the Chicago Statement, which he says cannot be translated out of its own particular north American, late-twentieth century context.  Franke’s remark is either incorrect, or else fails as an objection to the Chicago Statement.  If Franke means to deny the possibility of meaningful communication through language, then he cannot communicate his denial using language, as Norman Geisler notes.​[24]​  But if Franke only means that claims made in one cultural and temporal context do not mean the same thing in another context, his remark is precisely correct; for this is why we need things such as historical literacy and good translations.  Yet the objection is also entirely irrelevant.  For, if it is relevant, then a modified form of Geisler’s response will apply: Franke’s objection to the Chicago Statement will be no less invalid than the Chicago Statement itself after enough years have passed, and it is already invalid in, for example, sub-Saharan Africa.  Moreover, the Chicago Statement’s central inerrantist claim is only that the original intent of the human author of the Bible is always true.  For this claim to translate across time and cultures, it is merely necessary that the notions of authorship and truth be able to translate across time and cultures.  And of course they can; for a philosopher can believe that Confucius’ or Aristotle’s truth claims are not true, a historian can believe that Herodotus’ truth claims are true, and so on.
But there is more to say about textual realism.  Kevin Vanhoozer has dealt with the rejection of textual realism in Is There a Meaning in This Text?, and a thorough treatment of the topic is not necessary here.  A brief word on the rationality of accepting textual realism will suffice, for textual realism is indeed a rational view.  Vanhoozer delightfully links textual realism to Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology, which is rooted in the common-sense tradition of philosophers such as Thomas Reid.​[25]​  This is very right and proper; I am right to believe in textual realism in the same way I am right to believe that other minds exist, that a world outside my mind exists, that my five senses allow me to access that world, and so on.  If someone objects to any of these beliefs, I can reasonably infer that the objection is mistaken; if a good argument is given, I can reasonably infer that there is probably something wrong with the premises.
Now a thorough and complete defense of textual realism would entail a systematic dismantling of objections, a presentation of arguments for textual realism, and an account of the quality that makes my belief in it rational—the sort of account Plantinga eventually gave in his Warrant Trilogy.​[26]​  Nevertheless, even for a person who has not made such a defense or studied one made by others, it is best to accept the common-sense notion that there is a text having an original meaning which is to some degree accessible to the reader.  Like the belief that other minds exist, the eminently sensible belief in textual realism has a stronger presumption in its favor than the premises of any objection are likely ever to have.  The fact that you are reading a paragraph by me and understanding some (hopefully all) of what I say testifies to this.  You are able to claim that what I am saying is correct, incorrect, reasonable, etc. on the basis of whatever relevant evidence you have available.  Likewise, it is possible for an inerrantist to claim that the original meaning of a biblical author is entirely correct on the basis of whatever theological evidence he has available.
Now it may at first seem that the textual realism of Vanhoozer is inconsistent with biblical inerrancy, but this is not so.  Vanhoozer argues for a particular account of what biblical meaning is—that meaning is an action on the part of the author, an action demanding a response from the reader.  Inerrancy is merely a claim about the accuracy of the original meaning of the biblical text, not a claim about what that meaning is.  So far as I can tell, Vanhoozer’s analysis is entirely consistent with the Chicago Statement; moreover, insofar as it simultaneously supports biblical authority and considers biblical meaning as it is meant by the authors of the Bible, it implicitly supports the Chicago Statement’s central thesis.
Similarly, Hans Frei’s The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative may at first appear to be inconsistent with inerrancy.  (In fact, this volume was first recommend to me by someone who thought it book might cure me of my commitment to inerrancy!)  But Frei’s Eclipse merely resists the theory that biblical meaning is found in its reference to external fact, arguing that the meaning of the biblical text is found internally—in the biblical narrative.​[27]​  Such a claim can only refer to a narrative beyond that intended by the biblical authors, or to the narrative intended by them—although it is probably best to say that it is both.  Again, so far as I can tell, this is consistent with the Chicago Statement’s thesis; moreover, insofar as it both supports the authority of the Bible and simultaneously calls our attention to the narrative intent of the authors of Scripture, it is implicitly supportive of that thesis.  Inerrancy does not require that we consider Scripture to be a vast theological treatise consisting simply of one straightforward true proposition after another.  The Chicago Statement says, “history must be treated as history, poetry as poetry, hyperbole and metaphor as hyperbole and metaphor,” etc.  Let us also add, with Vanhoozer and Frei in mind: Action is to be taken as action, speech act as speech act, and narrative as narrative.  There may remain important differences on the intent of the authors, but the underlying agreement on the authority of their intent, among theologians who disagree over what that intent is, is even more important.
For precisely this reason, however, textual realism is one of the reasons I said at the beginning that inerrancy calls for humility on the part of the reader of Scripture.  The intent of the biblical authors is not always at arm’s length for us.  We easily misinterpret, especially under the influence of literary norms affecting our own post-Enlightenment culture and differing from those of the biblical cultures.  We read different poetry; we write letters according to different norms; our ways of doing philosophy are different; our standards for keeping historical records demand a higher degree of precision; and Hebrew is as much Greek to most of us as is koine Greek.  We must be humble because sometimes we cannot know what the authors of Scripture are saying as easily as we would like to.
An even more significant reason for humility is that sometimes when we do know what they are saying we cannot fully understand it.  As the truth accommodated to our human understanding it lacks correctness in the most robust sense; but it is not incorrect.​[28]​  As inerrantist Kenneth Kantzer said, Scripture is “divinely revealed misinformation about God.”  It takes humility to believe what we don’t understand, and at times biblical authority requires such humility of us.  Unlike the God of onto-theology, the God who inspires Scripture is a God before whom we can kneel in humble worship.
III. EPISTEMIC HUMILITY AND THE BIBLE
	This calls for revisiting the postmodern philosophers, who are surprisingly consistent with the inerrantist tradition.  Postmodern philosophers have not neglected to apply their insights to the Bible, and both they and the contemporary inerrantist tradition explain that we must approach the Bible with epistemic humility.  We must be humble as readers.  We also need an epistemically humble approach to authorship, an approach which is consistent with inerrancy and at which the contemporary inerrantist tradition occasionally hints.
Marion and Westphal are powerful figures in postmodern philosophy of religion, but it is best to begin with Jacques Derrida and to review postmodern theology’s usual alternative of doing without inerrancy.  Derridas has said, “There is nothing outside of the text,”​[29]​ meaning that there is no such thing as a construal of reality which is exhaustive, correct in every detail, and accessible to any attentive knower.  Every construal of reality is subject to interpretation; more precisely, every construal of reality is an interpretation of reality.
Unsurprisingly, there is a strong tradition among postmodern theologians of doing without inerrancy.  This seems a natural application of postmodernism, and is common, for example, in the Emerging Church.  Inerrancy may be rejected outright, or the theologian may suggest that it is a mistake even to ask whether inerrancy is correct. Or the doctrine may simply be set aside and ignored in favor of other hermeneutical principles.  Such principles may include the notion of the Bible as a narrative, the notion that the Bible’s authority is found in its guidance of the life of the church rather than in its propositional accuracy, or the notion that the Bible’s interpretation is the work of the Christian community rather than the work of scholars who have gained an expertise in the thoughts of long-dead writers.
If I am not mistaken, one or more of these non-inerrantist approaches is taken by such theologians as Stanley Grenz,​[30]​ Brian McLaren​[31]​ and Ray Anderson.​[32]​  However, I think we can do better, and I am certain we can do otherwise.  To be precise, we can do something more like what Augustine does, mingling inerrancy with some lessons of postmodernism—and perhaps incorporating some of the afore-mentioned hermeneutical principles favored by the non-inerrantist postmodern theologians.  Accordingly, in what follows I will explore the consistency of some postmodern insights with biblical inerrancy before exploring how such doctrines were harmonized in the theology of Augustine.
The inerrantist can incorporate Derrida’s insight, and Marion and some other Christian philosophers show how.​[33]​  The biblical text is neither exhaustive, nor fully accessible to all readers; moreover, while not incorrect, it is not correct in the robust sense denied by Kantzer.  In short, it is not the systematic construal of reality sought by Enlightenment philosophers.  It is a divinely inspired interpretation of reality—but still an interpretation.
	More than this, inerrancy suggests an epistemically humble approach to human authorship.  Inerrancy is rooted in the doctrine of the divine inspiration of Scripture.​[34]​  God is the reason that the biblical authors were protected from error, and God has a better knowledge of the text than even they did.  The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics is explicit on this: “We deny that the writers of Scripture always understood the full implications of their own words.”​[35]​  To limit the divine Author of Scripture to what its human authors understood is an idolatry of human authorship.  Furthermore, while the text is inerrant, what God does through the text is also important, and this is often more than the human author understood.  Inerrantists are explicit that, as Bernard Ramm says, “Interpretation is one, application is many.”​[36]​
	Marion goes much further in this vein, explicitly affirming that the meaning of the text is much more than its human authors intended, reminding us that the human component of Scripture is under the authority of Christ.  Intellectual idolatry is banished from our reading of Scripture when we acknowledge that its human authorship is under the authority of Christ, and that therefore a human interpreter should submit to the guidance of Christ.  The meaning of Scripture is not limited to that intended by its human authors, for God may bring to us any number of meanings of the text that are not contained within the author’s intent: “The text escapes the ownership of its literary producers in order to be inspired, so to speak, by the Word” (Christ).​[37]​  Under the authority of God’s use of the text, the text “offers, potentially, an infinite reserve of meaning” and “demands an infinity of interpretations, which, each one, leads a fragment of the text back to the Word,” which is the full meaning of Scripture, which is Christ.​[38]​ (In similar fashion, Franke suggests that the full meaning of Scripture is determined by the Holy Spirit, explicitly tying his theology to the hermeneutics of postmodern philosophy Paul Riceur.​[39]​)
Thus Marion on epistemic humility with regard to the biblical text.  Similarly, Westphal calls for rejecting the “traditional (modern) approach” according to which a text “contains all and only what the creator consciously intended.”​[40]​  He explicitly applies this insight to the biblical text, and favorably quotes Kantzer: The Bible, as “divinely revealed misinformation about God,” must be interpreted with humility.​[41]​
	At this point one may well respond:
Well, what is the use of inerrancy?  Why bother talking about such authority?  Why can’t I just read the Bible and trust God to show me what it means, since you’ve already admitted that God knows what it means better than the human authors?  Their authority does us no good when it’s so hard to know what they meant and when God can tell us more than what they meant.  Besides, inerrancy makes it too easy for us to set up our own interpretations as the right ones; we’ll start fighting each other over who has the original meaning and, before you know it, we’ll be so busy arguing that we’ll forget to love our neighbors!
These are good questions, and the answers are just as good: Inerrancy is just as useful as the original meaning of Scripture is available to us.  Sometimes the original meaning of a biblical text is more or less remote, and perhaps at times entirely obscure.  But the original meaning is sometimes more or less clear, tending at times towards complete lucidity.  These moments may be rarer than we would sometimes like, but at the very least they occur often enough to give us the basic truths of the faith and the command to love God and our neighbor.  Indeed, the love of God and neighbor, so important to this imagined (but typical) detractor from inerrancy, is meant to be expressed in a community grounded in the authority of Scripture.  This is why the authority of the human authors of Scripture was so important to the church fathers, and especially to Augustine, and it is to him that we now turn.  As we shall see, for Augustine the doctrine of authorial authority was never separate from the doctrine that textual meaning is not limited to authorial intent.
IV. THE RULE OF FAITH
	There is a curious misconception that, if the human author’s intent is not open to the possibility of error, all meaning that is not part of that meaning is excluded from the biblical text.​[42]​  Another common misconception is precisely the reverse: If not all biblical meaning is intended by its human authors, then their intent is open to the possibility of error.  But, as it happens, these doctrines are logically compatible.  Moreover, each is an essential part of the hermeneutical vision of Augustine.  In this section I shall first briefly look at his claim that authorial intent in the Bible is without error and that biblical meaning is not fully contained within the intent of its human authors.  Then I shall look at the relation of these two types of meaning, for Augustine took authorial intent to be the necessary guide that leads us to that meaning which transcends it.  Finally, I shall contrast the view I am developing with that of Vanhoozer’s “Augustinian inerrancy” and distinguish my view from some likely misunderstandings of it.
We need to see that the Fathers, like contemporary inerrantists, hold a high view of biblical authority, and that this high view extends to the intent of the human authors of Scripture.  For them, also, the intent of the human authors of Scripture is not open to the possibility of error.  Augustine, for example, affirms that Scripture is indeed the Word of God, saying that God might say to him, “O man, true it is that what my Scripture says I myself say.”​[43]​  Furthermore, “we dare not assert that” Moses “spoke anything we know or think to be false.”​[44]​  Believing that an author of Scripture is in error is simply not an option.
Of course, the Chicago Statement and the evangelical tradition it represents tend to employ a literal reading of Scripture, and deny the possibility of science correcting Scripture;​[45]​ yet Augustine is well-known for promoting non-literal readings of Scripture, and for allowing science (or the pre-science current in his day) to interpret Scripture!  But there is an agreement here on the authority of authorial intent (an authority higher than science).  If there is any divergence, it concerns what that intent is, not its authoritative character.
	But for Augustine the meaning of Scripture is not limited to authorial intent.  Augustine continues: “Therefore, while every man tries to understand in Holy Scripture what the author understood therein, what wrong is there if anyone understand what you . . . reveal to him as true, even if the author he reads did not understand this . . . ?”  The text is open to multiple true meanings.  Other Fathers, we may note, concur; according to John O’Keefe and R. R. Reno, for the “early Christian readers” it was no different: “They thought the Scriptures infinitely rich” in meaning.​[46]​  This point helps to close the conceptual gap between the modern mind and the ancient mind.
	Finally, we turn to the relation between authorial intent and textual meaning in the eyes of Augustine, for whom original authorial intent is precisely what leads us to the full significance of the biblical text.  The broader meaning of the text transcends the author’s intent; yet authorial intent is a bridge to this broader meaning.  I shall elaborate by making four observations.
In the first place, the intent of the human authors of Scripture is at least clear enough to tell us about the essential truths of the faith: The Trinity, the Incarnation, the drama of the creation-fall-incarnation-redemption narrative, etc.  Thus Augustine tells us that the clearly understood authorial intent is enough to tell us to love God and our neighbor: “what all that has been said amounts to . . . is that the fulfillment and the end of the law and of all the divine scriptures is love . . . .”​[47]​  Now this is in Book I, chapter 35 of his Teaching Christianity, and it is a summary of what has preceded.  In what has preceded he has given us a full course of Christian theology, including Trinitarianism (chapter 5), God’s unchangeableness (chapters 8-9), the Incarnation (chapters 11-14), the Resurrection and Ascension (chapter 15), ecclesiology (chapters 16-18), and eschatology (chapters 19-21).  It is worth noting, once more, that Augustine is not alone among Fathers in thinking that the intent of the human authors of Scripture gives us the basics of Christian doctrine.  O’Keefe and Reno explain:
According to Irenaeus, proper interpretation depends on fidelity to the apostolic witness, preserved in the canonical books and taught by the authority of those bishops who are successors to the apostles.  Irenaeus calls this witness the “rule of truth” or “rule of faith.”  This rule, which over the course of the early centuries of Christianity solidified into creeds, is an interpretive control that directs and orients the exegete as he employs various interpretive techniques.​[48]​

In the second place, authorial intent is a check on error when we are exploring the potentially infinite meaning of a text.  When faced with an ambiguous passage in Scripture, we are forbidden to assert that it means anything which would be contrary to the sense of a clearer passage.  As Augustine says, “faith will start tottering if the authority of scripture is undermined” by interpretations that are “impossible to square with the author’s meaning.”​[49]​  Though the fields of biblical meaning be infinite, we need not fear getting lost as we explore them, because we can at least be sure we are not going the wrong way.  For this reason, Augustine claims that even a mistaken interpretation of a biblical text that is nonetheless consistent with the rule of faith tends to do us good.​[50]​
	In the third place, authorial intent provides a goal for interpretation; when we interpret an ambiguous biblical text, we should aim to arrive at meanings that more fully express what is clear in Scripture.  When the text is ambiguous, the rule of thumb is to go with whatever meaning would express the truths of the faith and the love of God and neighbor.  Augustine says, “you should refer it to the rule of faith, which you have received from the plainer passages of scripture and from the authority of the Church . . . .”​[51]​  By interpreting ambiguous passages we are working to better express both the truths of the faith and the command to love.
	In the fourth place, the clear content of Scripture grounds a community of interpretation in which we live out what we know Scripture says and work together to learn what we don’t know about Scripture.  One passage beautifully depicting this is chapter 36 of Book I of Teaching Christianity, where Augustine explains how an interpretation errant yet supporting the love of God and neighbor does some good; yet one having such an interpretation should be corrected by those having a better knowledge of Scripture.  The very purpose of Teaching Christianity, a textbook for preachers, further confirms this notion of a communal reading of Scripture.  Again, although my emphasis is on Augustine, O’Keefe and Reno show how this attitude is not limited to Augustine: “scriptural interpretation was an ongoing research project under the guidance of a body of doctrine that they called the rule of truth or the rule of faith.”​[52]​  “A community of inquiry”​[53]​ was needed to conduct this research project.
It is in the context of such a community that authorial intent and the broader sense of the text come together.  As Augustine says, we read Scripture to know what its authors say and, by means of that, to know what God is saying to us.​[54]​  What they say gives us the truths of the faith; it also gives us the command to love God and our neighbor.  We practice love in the context of a community that guides interpretation according to these truths of the faith.  But, as Augustine says, without “the authority of Scripture” faith itself “will start tottering,” and without the faith “charity itself also begins to sicken.”​[55]​
	This, I suggest, is more truly an Augustinian inerrancy that what Vanhoozer has called such in his contribution to the volume Five Views on Biblical Inerrancy.​[56]​  Vanhoozer does tell us that his view is not actually Augustine’s.​[57]​  Rather, it is Augustinian in various respects.  For one, like Augustine it affirms “the entire truthfulness of the Bible in the strongest of terms.”​[58]​  Also, it is, like Augustine, literate, attentive to “the nature and interpretation of language.”​[59]​  It is, again like Augustine, well-versed in that it “[calls] attention to Scripture as composed of various kinds of discourse.”​[60]​  In a third similarity to Augustine, it “gives priority to the Bible’s own teaching about God, language, and truth.”​[61]​  This is all well and very good; I affirm it, and join Albert Mohler in recognizing that Vanhoozer’s is a serious commitment to inerrancy.​[62]​  I offer no objection to the very important analyses of the nature of the biblical text or of the biblical teaching on the nature of truth contained in Vanhoozer’s essay.​[63]​  Yet his inerrancy lacks two features of a thorough Augustinian inerrancy, for such would include an account of the meaning that was intended by the divine Author of Scripture yet not by its human authors, and an account of the connection between those two varieties of meaning.  A truly Augustinian inerrancy would allow for the clear affirmations of the authors of Scripture to govern our explorations of meanings of which they were not aware.
	At this point it would be appropriate to address two possible misunderstandings.  In the past few paragraphs I have been looking at several different sources of meaning or authority including the original meaning of the Bible, the rule of faith, and the testimony of the church.   How are these authorities related, and what did Augustine (and other Fathers) think of the relation?  Does biblical authority establish the other authorities, or vice versa?  Or are these authorities mutually interdependent?  These are interesting and important questions, but as it happens they are outside the scope of this paper; I am not staking out a position on any of them (though I myself am a child of the Reformation and the doctrine of sola Scriptura).  Here I have been concerned only with other questions: whether the inerrancy of original meaning is compatible with meaning which goes beyond the original, what is the relationship between these two kinds of meaning, and what some noteworthy theologians and philosophers have thought of these matters.
	Finally, I am not endorsing Augustine’s famed allegorical technique for reading Scripture.  While I think his overall hermeneutic provides strong safeguards against grievous error, I think a better way of finding biblical meaning outside the original intent of the human authors would focus more sharply on Old Testament pictures of the Gospel.  Old Testament pictures and predictions of the Messiah frequently had more meaning than the Old Testament authors could fully know.  And, in keeping with Augustine’s own advice to let known authorial intent guide our exploration of other meanings of Scripture, we should look to the explicit teaching of New Testament writers to make these richer Old Testament readings clear.
IV. CONCLUSION
	I have examined some of the hermeneutical principles of two recent movements in Christian theology.  According to the doctrine of biblical inerrancy as it has been recently developed by Evangelicals, Scripture has an original meaning, and that meaning is protected from error by divine inspiration.  According to some thinkers in postmodern theology, Scripture calls for epistemic humility, we should not approach the biblical text through the paradigms of Enlightenment rationality, and the meaning of Scripture transcends its original meaning.  These notions are not only consistent but are harmonized in the writings of Augustine.  Perhaps there is room for friendship between postmodern Christians and inerrantists, for they share a common heritage in Augustine, in whom some of their most cherished doctrines are both honored and harmonized.
	I said at the beginning that there are insights treasured by the traditions of inerrancy and postmodern theology, insights which are consistent and can be integrated and have been integrated.  If my analysis is correct, then it contains no original thoughts, but only thoughts expressed differently in different ages.  If it were the case that these thoughts had not been expressed since ancient times, then my analysis would be very useful indeed.
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